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The likelihood of cyber-attacks against information systems and related production control systems has
increased. In order to lower the risk of cyber-attacks, OS makers release timely security updates.
However, the amount of time that is available for applying patches is limited on production control
systems and the possibility of side effects is a concern. Therefore, we focused on the patch application
cycle and the period of pretest, and proposed optimal OS measures for production control systems. We
presented the method for quantifying the risk of cyber-attacks on production control systems due to
security patches not being applied and for expressing the risk as a monetary amount. This method was
also proposed for deriving the patch application cycle, the number of applications, and the optimum test
duration. We concluded that this method help to understand the patch management and related security
measure and to protect production control systems from cyber-attacks.
 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd.1. Introduction
Production control systems are used during the manufacturing
process for items such as automobiles and electrical machinery
and in utility-related industries for controls related to commodities
such as electricity, gas, and water. In the past, there has generally
been a line of demarcation between production control systems
and information systems. These systems have generally been
differentiated based on hardware, operating systems (OSs), and
applications (Miyachi, 2012; Nawa, 2012; Takegami & Nawa,
2013). However, production control and information systems have
many features in common (JPCERT Coordination Center, 2008) and
the likelihood of cyber-attacks against information systems and
related production control systems has increased. The reasons for
these changes are that the development processes for production
control systems and themethods of use have changed dramatically.
With respect to the development processes, general-purpose tech-
nologies are being employed more frequently in order to increase
functionality and to cut costs. In addition, the usage of Windows-
and Linux-based man–machine interface functions has also
increased (Miyachi, 2012). With regard to methods of use, produc-
tion control systems and information systems have often been
implemented as isolated networks (Information-TechnologyPromotion Agency, Japan (IPA) 2000a, 2000b) in the past, but in
recent years, this has become impractical. There is an increasing
need for the data that is held by production control systems to be
shared with other information systems. The reasons for this change
include requests regarding information disclosure, inventory
reduction, consistent management, strengthening of the demand
for remote operations for laborsaving management, and system
maintenance. In addition, there are many cases where exchanges
of data for production system settings and log information are car-
ried out routinely via external storage media such as USB memory
(Miyachi, 2012) even in cases where the network is disconnected.
It is common for production equipment to be utilized continu-
ously over a period of several decades and it is likely for the related
production control systems to continue operation for an extremely
long period compared to the usual three-to-ﬁve year period for
updates to computers. In addition, even if security patches (hereaf-
ter referred to simply as ‘‘patches’’) are provided, there is a fear of
the possibility of side effects when they are applied and of the pos-
sibility of additional testing costs for conﬁrming that there are no
side effects. As a result, it is common for production control sys-
tems to continue in operation without updates as long as there
are no obvious malfunctions. Furthermore, for production control
systems where continuous operation is required, the timing for
enabling minor modiﬁcations, such as the application of patches,
often does not come around without a long wait (Miyachi, 2012).
The present study focuses on the application of security patches
for protecting systems from cyber-attacks and considers the cur-
rent states of production control systems. It presents a method
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patch applications. This methodminimizes the sum of the expected
costs for losses resulting from not applying patches and the costs
that are incurred while testing in order to conﬁrm that side effects
will not occur when patches are applied. Security patches are
applied routinely to terminals in information systems. The patching
process is recognized as a necessary measure for protecting com-
puters from the threats due to computer viruses (hereafter referred
to simply as ‘‘viruses’’) and instances of malicious access. The efﬁ-
cacy of patching processes has been conﬁrmed (IPA, 2008). Many
ﬁrms and organizations have come to rely on the information sys-
tem division for security measures. However, with regard to pro-
duction control systems, many rely on the factory or the business
division for procurement and management of operations. As a
result, the information system division often has no grasp of the
realities related to the production control systems and the business
division’s sense of ownership of security measures is low (Miyachi,
2012). The present study provides clues for ﬁlling in the gaps
regarding security measures in this type of organization.2. Control systems and cyber-attacks
An example of a production control system in a manufacturing
industry is shown in Fig. 1.
The risk of exposure to cyber-attacks has increased in produc-
tion control systems in recent years because of connections to
the outside world via USB memory and maintenance networks,
connections between information systems and the Internet,
deployments of open communication protocols (e.g., TCP/IP), and
deployments of open source operating systems and tools
(Takegami & Nawa, 2013).
The Stuxnet computer virus, which was conﬁrmed in July 2010,
is a concrete example of a cyber-attack on a production control
system. This virus exploited a weakness in Microsoft’s Windows
OS and targeted the control system software of the German com-
pany Siemens. It spread via external storage media and networks
and had the distinguishing feature of spreading infection when a
user browsed a ﬁle, especially from USB memory (Falliere,M
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Fig. 1. System architecture of Production Control Systems (Source: IPA, ‘‘The 2010 ﬁscal
pp. 14 (IPA, 2011) (author added)).Murchu, & Chien, 2010; Takegami & Nawa, 2013). There were also
reports that Stuxnet targeted the control systems of Iran’s atomic
power plants (Kobayashi, Kaine, & Taniguchi, 2012). If an attack
affects organizations and industries that are responsible for impor-
tant social infrastructure, the damage will be extensive. In addi-
tion, if an attack compromises or disables the production control
system at a manufacturing ﬁrm, it is likely that large business
losses will ensue. As a result, manufacturing sites, which up to this
time have been regarded as a sector that is impervious to cyber-
attacks, require security measures.
The following measures should be considered as production
control system security measures (Kobayashi et al., 2012;
Kuipers & Fabro, 2006; Miyachi, 2012; Stouffer, Falco, & Scarfone,
2011; Takano, 2007, 2008, 2009).
(1) Software measures (i.e., application of security patches to
general purpose OSs and antivirus software)
(2) Minimal platform services (i.e., minimal number of applica-
tions, minimal number of databases, and minimal number of
protocols)
(3) Multi-layered defenses (i.e., ﬁrewalls, intrusion defense sys-
tems, defenses based on zoning, and physical access
management)
Applications of security patches (1) are basic and effective mea-
sures that are carried out routinely by information technology divi-
sions for general-purpose operating systems, such as Microsoft
Windows and Linux because of new vulnerabilities that are
reported nearly every month. For production control systems, on
the other hand, the amount of time that is available for applying
patches is limited and the possibility of side effects is a concern.
There are problems that must be overcome for (1) regarding the
timing of the patching process and the implementation of testing
for conﬁrming that there are no side effects. Regarding the mea-
sures for (2) and (3), when it is impossible to routinely carry out
the measures for (1), consideration is given to substitute measures
in order to minimize the potential for damage (Kobayashi et al.,
2012; Miyachi, 2012; Takano, 2007, 2008, 2009). However, these
alternatives also are less than perfect. Therefore, it is vital toetwork
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Fig. 2. Research ﬂow.
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ordinary information systems, in order to be able to cope with
attacks from diverse routes. The proposal in the present study
focuses on the current situation and on methods for eliminating
software vulnerabilities, which is the most basic measure, while
comprehending the efﬁcacy of the measures for (2) and (3).
3. Previous research
Within Japan, the Information-Technology Promotion Agency,
Japan (IPA) (IPA, 2000a, 2000b) started performing validation test-
ing for control system security in about 2000. Field surveys were
carried out in Japan, America, Europe, and Asia (IPA, 2011). How-
ever, compared to the awareness of security issues related to gen-
eral information systems, the awareness of issues related to
security for production control systems has been low until
recently. Cyber-attacks on control systems ﬁrst began to garner
special attention with the appearance of the Stuxnet computer
virus that was discovered in July 2010. The details of Stuxnet were
presented in a report by the U.S. company Symantec (Falliere et al.,
2010) and in a conference presentation by Takegami and Nawa
(2013).
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
(Stouffer et al., 2011), the International Society of Automation
(ISA), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are report-
ing on control system security guidelines and standards at the
international level (JPCERT Coordination Center, 2009). In addition,
in the U.K., the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure
(CPNI) has compiled guidelines for patch management and pre-
sented procedures for ﬁxing software security-based vulnerabili-
ties (CPN-I, 2006). These guidelines give guidance for the use of
these measures that is consolidated and useful. However, the
guidelines do not touch on speciﬁc details such as the timing and
costs that are incurred when, for example, the security patches
are applied at a ﬁrm’s production site.
In the software engineering ﬁeld, patch management research is
being carried out from the standpoint of the software developer.
Research from this point of view implements a model of a process
in which the software vendor discovers program vulnerabilities,
the costs for the development and distribution of the patches are
incorporated in the model, and the patch release period and related
topics are discussed (Cavusoglu, Cavusoglu, & Zhang, 2008; Goel &
Okumoto, 1979; Kimura, 2003; Tokumi, Okamura, & Dohi, 2010). In
these studies, the vulnerability report numbers from Internet
Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, and sendmail are used as empirical data
in order to understand the incidents and trends for software
vulnerability.
Regarding cyber-attacks on production control systems, guide-
lines for countermeasures have been compiled by public organiza-
tions in Japan, America, and Europe. However, although the
importance of this problem has come to be recognized, virtually
no academic, empirical research has been conducted regarding this
problem up to this point. In addition, although patch management
research has been conducted from the viewpoint of software ven-
dors, research has not been carried out based on the viewpoints of
the organizations and ﬁrms that use the production control sys-
tems. The present study focuses on software security patch man-
agement and the sorts of measures that should be adopted in
order to protect production control systems from cyber-attacks.
The present study also incorporates empirical research that takes
risks and costs into account.
4. Features of the present study
The present study includes the following features:(1) It proposes software countermeasures against cyber-attacks
are speciﬁcally designed for use by organizations and ﬁrms
that use production control systems.
(2) It proposes a model that focuses on software vulnerabilities
and takes into account the risks of suffering a cyber-attack
and the costs related to patch application.
(3) It deduces the optimum values for the patch application
cycle and the pretest period.
5. Prerequisites of the present study
(1) The present study discusses countermeasures for general
purpose OSs related to production control systems and
focuses more on software measures than on other measures
that were described in Section 2. (Windows XP is considered
as an example here.)
(2) Regarding the patch application order, the patches should be
applied in the order they are released by Microsoft and none
should be ignored.
(3) The patches should be applied periodically based on opera-
tions. In addition, the performance of the production control
system should be validated in a test environment before the
patches are applied in the production environment.
(4) It should be possible to repair a malfunction of the produc-
tion control system due to the application of a patch by
the addition of a ﬁx to the system.
(5) If all patches that have been released have been applied, the
possibility of suffering damage from a cyber-attack should
be close to zero.
(6) The severity levels of vulnerabilities are posted by Microsoft,
but all are treated equally in our method.
6. Study method
6.1. Research ﬂow
Fig. 2 shows the research ﬂow.
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6.2.1. [STEP 1] Data collection
Microsoft’s Windows XP has been used for a comparatively long
time. Regarding the information about vulnerabilities and security
patches for Microsoft’s Windows XP, all of the data since the OS
was ﬁrst marketed was collected (collected data (1)). Next, the data
related to virus infections and virus damage was collected for use
as the basic data regarding cyber-attacks (collected data (2)).
<Collected data (1)>
 Target OS: Windows XP
 Source: Microsoft Security Bulletins (Microsoft, 2014)
 Items used: ‘‘Security patch (security update program)’’
 Target period: November 2001 to December 2013
(145 months)
<Collected data (2)> Source: Fiscal year 2011 information security event dam-
age situation survey – report – (IPA, 2012)
 Survey organization: Information-Technology Promotion
Agency, Japan
 Items used:
‘‘Applications of security patches’’
‘‘Damage situations due to computer viruses’’
‘‘Direct virus damage’’
 Target period: April 2011 to Mar. 2012
 Responding ﬁrms: 17676.2.2. [STEP 2] Understanding the trend for the total number of
security patches
Fig. 3 is a graph that displays the number of months since
November 2001 (i.e., the month when Windows XP was released)
on the horizontal axis and the number of accumulated security
patches on the vertical axis.
As shown in the ﬁgure, based on the linear regression from the
actual values, an approximately straight line y = 3.1799x was
obtained for a coefﬁcient of determination of 0.954. The discussion
below will proceed using the triangle that is bounded by this
approximately straight line and the vertical and horizontal axes.
In other words, it will use the triangle having its origin and vertex
of (145, 461) (145, 0).
6.2.3. [STEP 3] Construct a model of the relationship between the
pretest for applying a patch in the production environment and the
vulnerabilities of the general purpose OS
In general, it is asserted that security patches should be applied
as soon as possible after they are released by Microsoft. The reason
for this stance is that there are risks associated with not carrying
out countermeasures when OS vulnerabilities have become aFig. 3. Number of accumulated security patches.matter of public knowledge. Therefore, some organizations
recommend that automatic updates should be enabled for terminals
that are used for general business purposes. However, there are dif-
ferent recommendations for terminals that are used for vital or
unique systems. For caseswhere thereare concernsabout thepoten-
tial for side effects, there are guidelines that recommend deploy-
ment to the production environment only after normal operations
have been conﬁrmed in a test environment (CPN-I, 2006;
Takizawa, 2004). Stability is the top priority at production sites
where continuous operation and safety are demanded for the pro-
duction control systems. Based on these concerns and guidelines, a
procedure is followed in the present study inwhich patches are only
applied in a production control systemafter a pretest has completed
and normal operations have been conﬁrmed in a test environment.
Stability is increased by undertaking this procedure, but additional
time and costs are required in order to conduct the tests.When com-
pared to the kind of expeditiousness that can be realized by applying
patches without testing, large demerits result. On the other hand,
viewed from a different angle, the decision to reduce the test dura-
tion must be based on analysis of the trade-off between time and
costs. Test crashing is a method for shortening test duration by
reducing the time of one or more of the critical activities to a time
that is less than the normal activity time. This reduction in the nor-
mal activity times is referred to as crashing (Bernard, 2013). In this
study, this matter will be modeled and expressed using an equation
as a ﬁrst step toward a resolution of this difﬁculty. Prior research
regardingmanufacturing lot sizes and inventory maintenance costs
(Joglekar, 1988; Lin, 2009) are integrated in this model.
<Keys used>
D: Number of all security patches (=461)
(from the estimated value of the approximately straight
line from Fig. 3)
Q: Number of security patches applied at one time (number)
N: Number of times security patches applied (times) ((Exam-
ple) Total number of times between November 2001 and
December 2013)
n: Integer that expresses the number of times security
patches were applied (n = 1, 2, . . ., N)
T: Security patch application cycle (months)
K: Number of months from when the OS was released to the
most recent month (December 2013) (= 145 months)
L: Test duration (months) (Test duration expression without
considering a shortened duration (normal duration))
S: Test cost (¥1,000/time) (when performed during a normal
duration)
TC: Total costs related to patch management (total cost)
(¥1,000 units)
i: Crash pattern of test duration (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4)
i ¼
0 . . . All processes—normal duration
1 . . . 1st process—minimum duration;
others-normal duration
2 . . . 1st—2nd processes—minimum duration;
others-normal duration
3 . . . 1st—3rd processes—minimum duration;
others-normal duration
4 . . . All 4 processes—minimum
8>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>:
Li: Test duration expression when considering a shortened
duration (months)
C(Li): Crash cost (Test duration shortening cost) (¥1,000
units)
j: The jth process
Fig. 4.
and tes
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1 . . . Unit test
2 . . . Combined test
3 . . . System test
4 . . . Operation test
8>><
>>:
ai: Minimum duration for the jth process of the test
(months)
bi: Normal duration for the jth process of the test (months)
ci: Cost of shortening the jth process of the test by one
month (¥1,000/month)
u: Probability of the production control system suffering
damage when one patch has not been applied
v: Anticipated loss amount when the production control sys-
tem has suffered damage once (¥1,000 units)
h: Anticipated loss amount when one patch has not been
applied (¥1,000 units)Now, the area of the shaded portion in Fig. 4 is derived. The
straight line OP in Fig. 4 is equivalent to the approximately straight
line for the number of accumulated patches in Fig. 3. Based on
Fig. 4, when the step form areas of OB1A1 . . . Bn1An-1BnP are sub-
tracted from the area of the large triangle OPR, the area for the
shaded portion of the ﬁgure is obtained. This area is proportional
to the number of vulnerabilities and the length of the time that
the patches have not been applied. For example, in the case of Win-
dows XP, this includes patches for the time period between
November 2001 and December 2013. Incidentally, the test dura-
tion (L) that is used in this step does not take into consideration
the possibility of shortening the duration of the test.
 Area of the large triangle OPR
¼ 1
2
 NT  NQ ð1Þ
 Areas of the OB1A1 . . .Bn1An1BnP step forms
¼ B1A1Y1Rþ B2A2Y2Y1 þ    þ Bn1An1BnYn2
¼ Q 1 L
T
 
ðNT  TÞ þ
XN
n¼2
QðNT  nTÞ
¼ Q
2
ðN2T  NT  2NLþ 2LÞ ð2ÞRelationship between lot size of security patches (Q), application period (T),
t duration (L). Area of the shaded portion
¼ Area of the large triangle OPR Areas of the
OB1A1 . . .Bn1An1BnP step forms
¼ Q
2
ðNT þ 2NL 2LÞ ð3Þ
From NQ = D and NT = K,
T ¼ K
N
ð4Þ
Q ¼ D
N
ð5Þ
If these are substituted in Eq. (3),
 Area of the shaded portion
¼ D
2N
N  K
N
þ 2NL 2L
 
¼ KD
2N
þ DL DL
N
ð6Þ
The area of the large triangle OPR in Fig. 4 is the number of
accumulated security patches that have been released in the period
from the release of the OS up to the present time (December 2013)
multiplied by the number of months. In other words, it is a
temporal summation of the risk that the production control
system suffers a cyber-attack via a general purpose OS. On the
other hand, the areas of the OB1A1 . . .Bn1An1BnP step forms
are the areas of long, thin strips that have been stacked
(B1A1Y1Rþ B2A2Y2Y1 þ    þ Bn1An1BnYn2). If patches are applied
periodically at times when the system can be modiﬁed, the risk that
is represented by the portions of the areas of the strips will be elim-
inated. In addition, the area of the shaded portion expresses the
degree of risk that remains temporarily for terminals in production
control systems that cannot be updated via automatic updates
immediately after the release of a patch. This area increases and
decreases depending on the length of the test duration. For exam-
ple, if the duration of the test period is long enough, newer patches
may be released while the original patch is being tested. If this
occurs, the patch is no longer the newest patch when it is in fact
applied in the production environment at the end of the test. The
application of the newest patch will be put off until the next time
that patches are applied and the area of the shaded portion (i.e.,
the degree of risk) increases.
6.2.4. [STEP 4] Construct a model of the relationship between the
efﬁciency and the cost of the pretest process
The software testing process typically includes unit testing,
combined testing, and system testing (Ishihara & Tanaka, 2012).
In some cases, an operation test is also added. The unit tests
determine whether the source code acts per the speciﬁcations on
a unit-by-unit basis. The combined tests involve functional tests
of combinations of individual units that are performed after unit
testing is complete. In addition, the system test veriﬁes that the
program has gone through the unit test and the combined test
and that the program is operating per the speciﬁcations. The oper-
ation tests are designed to determine whether the system is able to
endure use in the environment in which it will be employed by the
user. The four types of tests are performed here in order (Fig. 5).
If a single security patch is being applied to a production control
system, decisions about the quantity of testing that will be per-
formed may be left to the judgement of the organization. However,
in cases where all of the patches that have been released in severalUnit test Combined System test Operaontesttest
Fig. 5. Proposed software test process.
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anticipated that a considerable amount of detailed testing will be
required. When a large number of tests is required, it is important
to determine how the tests can be conducted quickly, efﬁciently,
and accurately. This is an issue that needs to be resolved so that
the risk of suffering a cyber-attack can be reduced.
Now, when the jth process in the testing process is set to be car-
ried out in the normal duration bi, the cost per unit time period for
shortening the duration of the testing is set to ci so that the testing
can be completed in the minimum duration ai. In general, there is a
tradeoff relationship between the construction period and the cost
at the manufacturing site or the construction site (Hendrickson,
1998). This relationship can be expressed using Eqs. (7)–(10).
The test duration Li is
Li ¼
X4
j¼1
bj 
Xi
j¼1
bj  aj
  ð7Þ
However,
L0 ¼
X4
j¼1
bj ð8Þ
where i and j, respectively, express the crash patterns of test
duration and each process (refer to the keys used in STEP 3). Five
patterns are given here.
The crash cost C(Li) can be expressed as follows:
when i = 0
CðL0Þ ¼ 0 ð9Þ
and when i = 1 to 4
CðLiÞ ¼
Xi
j¼1
cjðbj  ajÞ ð10Þ6.2.5. [STEP 5] Establishing the probability that a production control
system will suffer damage and the level of damage that will be
sustained when one patch has not been applied
The probability that the production control system will suffer
damage when one patch has not been applied is derived from
the data that was collected in STEP 1. In a survey for the ﬁscal year
2011, the percentage of ﬁrms that responded that security patches
‘‘are almost never applied’’ to local, internal servers was 21.6%. In
addition, 16.9% responded that they ‘‘had experienced a virus
infection.’’ Based on the fact that 61 security patches were released
during this ﬁscal year, the probability of a local, internal server
being infected with a virus when one patch was not applied is as
follows.
0:216 0:169
61
¼ 5:984 104 ð11Þ
Regarding the direct damages from viruses, the percentages for
items that affected production activities were: ‘‘computer unit
stoppage,’’ 42.5%, ‘‘system stoppage and drop in performance,’’
17.1%, and ‘‘network delay,’’ 10.7%. Based on these statistics, the
probability (u) that a production control system will suffer damage
when one patch has not been applied is as follows.
u ¼ 5:984 104  ð0:425þ 0:171þ 0:107Þ
¼ 4:207 104 ð12Þ
The next step is to calculate the expected loss amount (v) for an
organization when the production control system has suffered
damage one time. However, it is difﬁcult to establish a general loss
amount because different conditions are anticipated for each orga-
nization. Rather, treating v as a variable parameter and establishingthe loss amount based on the conditions for each organization
would have wide application. Therefore, if u and v are determined,
the expected loss amount (h) can be obtained for the situation
where one patch has not been applied.
h ¼ uv ð13Þ
6.2.6. [STEP 6] Cost and efﬁciency simulation related to general-
purpose OS patch management
A formula is used to express the total cost (TC) that is required
for patch management related to Windows XP from the release to
the present. Then, a solution is sought for minimizing TC. We
deﬁne an unpatched state (the shaded portion in Fig. 4) that
expresses the likelihood of a loss to the organization when security
patches have not been applied even though they have been
released. In other words, we deﬁne the cost for preventing virus
attacks against the organization. These costs are calculated by mul-
tiplying h by the area of the shaded portion in Fig. 4. In addition,
the cost S of implementing a normal duration testing process is
generated N times from the OS release and because the cost C(Li)
for shortening the test duration is generated N times in the same
manner, the total cost TC can be expressed using Eqs. (14) and (15).
 Total cost TC
¼ h ðarea of the shaded portion in Fig:4Þ
þ ðcost for the testing processÞ
þ ðcost for shortening the duration of the testÞ ð14Þ
TC ¼ h KD
2N
þ DL DL
N
 
þ NSþ NCðLiÞ ð15Þ
Now, when considering the case where C(L0) = 0 (the case where
shortening of the test duration is not considered), it becomes
TC ¼ h KD
2N
þ DL DL
N
 
þ NS ð16Þ
and when this is converted into a single-stage partial differential for
N, it becomes
@TC
@N
¼ hD
2N2
ð2L KÞ þ S ð17Þ
Additionally, a two-stage partial differential for N becomes
@2TC
@N2
¼ hD
N3
ðK  2LÞ ð18Þ
When L <
K
2
@2TC
@N2
> 0 ð19Þ
When L >
K
2
@2TC
@N2
< 0 ð20Þ
and this function form can be argued. In this case, the discussion
will proceed based on the premise that Eq. (19) is true, because K
= 145 (months) and a test duration that exceeds 72.5 months is
not realistic. TC becomes a downward convex function at this time.
Therefore, when
@TC
@N
¼ 0; TC reaches a minimum:
When N is derived from
@TC
@N
¼ hD
2N2
ð2L KÞ þ S ¼ 0;
Fig. 6. Number of security patch applications N and Total cost TC (duration:
November, 2001–December, 2013) (for case where L = 4, C(L0) = 0).
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N ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
hDðK  2LÞ
2S
r
ð21Þ
Now, D and K are known and are 461 and 145 months, respectively.
In addition, h can be derived from Eq. (13). If the test duration L and
the costs S for the normal duration test for one instance are each
established in conformance with the production control system in
the organization, then N can be derived analytically. Naturally, N
must be a positive integer for the number of times that the patches
are applied and N must be the integer that is closest to the value
that was obtained using Eq. (21). The integer N that causes TC to
reach a minimum value becomes the solution. In addition, because
T = K/N, T can also be derived from these values.Up to this point, a
method has been presented for deriving N and T analytically with-
out considering a shortening of the test duration. The test duration L
has been ﬁxed. Next, a method will be presented for deriving the
optimum test duration in cases where the shortening of the test
duration is considered. This method is based on a simulation that
includes numerical examples. The parameter Li represents the dura-
tion of the test when the shortening of the test duration is being
considered. The area of the shaded portion in Fig. 4 displays the
degree of risk that the organization will suffer a loss. This risk is
expressed as the amount of money that represents the cost. In addi-
tion, the Li at which TC reaches a minimum is derived from a simu-
lation based on the fact that there is a tradeoff between the cost
corresponding to the area of the shaded portion in Fig. 4 and the
crash cost. The relational expressions for (7)–(10) are used for the
calculation of the test duration Li as well as the crash cost C(Li).
7. Study results
7.1. Establishing the estimated loss
The estimated loss amount v for the organization when the pro-
duction control system has suffered damage once is established for
carrying out the simulation. Because the amount of the loss differs
depending on the organization and the individual system and is
not determined uniformly, the simulation is performed here using
v = 100,000 (¥1000 units). From Eq. (13), the estimated loss
amount h when a patch has not been applied one time becomes
h ¼ 4:207 104  100;000  42:1 ðU1;000 unitsÞ ð22Þ
In those cases where the model equation in the present study is
used for an actual ﬁrm, the estimated loss amount v is established
in conformance with the conditions of the individual ﬁrm and h is
derived based on those conditions.
7.2. The results of simulation
The results of the simulation for the case where shortening of
the test duration is not considered are shown in Fig. 6 and 7, and
in Table 1. For these conditions, the test duration L was ﬁxed at
4 months and the crash cost C(Li) was ﬁxed at 0 (¥1,000 units)
for the case where i = 0. The values for the number of patch appli-
cation times N and the security patch application cycle T are
allowed to vary and the values for N and T are recorded when
the total cost TC reaches a minimum. Because the total cost TC
changes as the testing cost S changes, the values for N and T are
shown in the table based on six different values for S.
Next, Table 2 shows the numerical examples that are the basis
for carrying out a simulation in which the shortening of the test
duration is considered. The test duration Li and the crash cost
C(Li) that are shown in Table 3 are derived from the normal dura-
tion bi for each process j in this table, the value of the durationshortening cost ci per unit duration, and the relational expressions
for (7)–(10).
In addition, in Table 4 shows the total cost TC for each test dura-
tion Li for the conditions where N = 12 (times), T = 12.1 (months),
and S = 10,000 (¥1,000 units) using the ﬁgures derived in Table 3.
Fig. 8 displays a graph of these results.
8. Discussion
The results from this study are all examples in which the Win-
dows XP general purpose OS was used. As of December 2013,
145 months had passed since the release of this OS and the present
study investigated security patch management during this period.
First, the relationship between the total cost TC, the degree of risk
of suffering a cyber-attack (in terms of cost), and the test cost are
considered based on Eq. (15). The ﬁrst item in Eq. (15) is the degree
of risk of suffering a cyber-attack and the second item is the cost
for the testing process.
First of all, this study focuses on the number of times N that
security patches are applied in Eq. (15) and considers the relation-
ship between the degree of risk of suffering a cyber-attack and the
cost for the testing process. The third item also is related to N.
However, since the ultimate goal is to clarify the relationship
between the ﬁrst item and the second item, the discussion pro-
ceeds based on the assumption that the test duration will be nor-
mal and shortening of the test duration is not considered. If the
number of times N that patches are applied increases, the degree
of risk of suffering a cyber-attack decreases in Eq. (15). However,
the costs for the testing process increase. Conversely, if the number
of times N that patches are applied decreases, then the degree of
risk increases and the costs decrease. From the standpoint of the
organization, it is understood that if the cost for the testing process
increases, the risk of suffering a cyber-attack may decrease and
when the cost is low, the level of risk may increase. Therefore,
the relationship between the risk of suffering a cyber-attack and
the cost of the testing process is a tradeoff relationship and it
can be a thorny problem for an organization. This tradeoff relation-
ship assigns extreme values to the total cost TC and a minimum
value exists in Eq. (15) as shown in Fig. 6. Fig. 6 is a graph of the
case where the crash cost has set to zero (C(L0) = 0) and L has been
ﬁxed (L = 4 in this case).
Next, the cost of testing (S) is focused on. In Fig. 6, the total cost
TC is shown as S changes in six steps from ¥500,000 to
¥15,000,000. From this ﬁgure, it can be observed that the greater
that S is, the greater the total cost TC is and if N becomes large,
the disparities in TC become larger due to the size of S. On the other
hand, based on the fact that T = K/N = 145/N, it can be observed that
the relationship between the patch application cycle T and TC is a
relationship that is opposite to the relationship between N and TC.
In other words, it can be observed in Fig. 7 that the greater that T
Fig. 7. Update cycle for security patch T and Total cost TC (for case where
L = 4, C(L0) = 0).
Table 1
Test cost S and optimum number of patches, optimum cycle (for case where
L = 4, C(L0) = 0).
Test cost S (thousand yen) 15,000 10,000 5000 2000 1000 500
Optimum number of
security patch
application N (times)
9 12 16 27 36 52
Optimum update cycle of
security patch
application T (months)
16.1 12.1 9.1 5.4 4.0 2.8
Table 2
Numerical examples for crash time.
Process
j
Normal
duration bj
(months)
Minimum
duration aj
(months)
Crash time
bj–aj
(months)
Unit crash cost cj
(thousand yen/
months)
1 0.8 0.3 0.5 800
2 0.8 0.3 0.5 900
3 1.2 0.6 0.6 2000
4 1.2 0.6 0.6 3000
Total 4.0 1.8 2.2
Table 3
Test duration Li and crash cost C(Li).
Crash pattern of test
duration i
Test duration Li
(months)
Crash cost C (Li)
(thousand yen)
0 4.0 0
1 3.5 400
2 3.0 850
3 2.4 2050
4 1.8 3850
Fig. 8. Relationship between test duration Li and Total cost TC based on crash cost
C(Li) (for case where N = 12, T = 12.1, S = 10,000).
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S. In addition, it is clear from Fig. 7, that there is a patch application
cycle T in which TC is at a minimum. The N and T values are shown
in Table 1 for each test cost Swhen TC takes on a minimum value. If
S is ﬁxed and the patch application is performed in accordanceTable 4
Test duration Li and Total cost TC (in case of N = 12 (T = 12.1), S = 10,000).
Test duration Li (months) 4.0
The number of security patch application N (times) 12
The update cycle of security patch application T (months) 12.1
The risk of security unpatched duration (thousand yen) r 188,420
Test cost N times N⁄S (thousand yen) s 120,000
Crash cost N times N⁄C (Li) (thousand yen) t 0
Total cost TC (thousand yen) (r +s +t) 308,420with the cycle T shown in Table 1, then the total cost TC related
to patch management, which includes the degree of risk of suffer-
ing a cyber-attack (in terms of cost) and the testing cost TC, can be
minimized. There are many instances where the size of S for the
production control system is dependent on the level of precision
of the test and the scale of the target system. In general, the greater
the scale and importance of the production control system, the
higher the cost for conducting the test. In addition, there are cases
where halting the system is fraught with difﬁculty even if it is only
for an extremely short duration. Organizations must intentionally
set aside intervals for applying patches to production control sys-
tems because they cannot carry out testing and applications of
patches on these systems frequently. In the present study, an
example is given for a case where the testing cost S is
¥10,000,000, the number of times N that patches are applied is
12 times, and the patch application cycle T is 12.1 months, and
consideration is given for shortening the test duration. The patch
application cycle T of 12.1 months (i.e., about one year) is a typical
example. It can represent a case where patches are applied during
an organization’s long vacation at year-end and during the New
Year holidays.
Shortening of the test duration will be considered now. A sim-
ulation is performed here using the numerical examples from
Tables 2 and 3. The numerical examples in Table 2 represent the
characteristic values for each process when the test has been
divided into four processes. The numerical examples in Table 3
based on Table 2 represent the test duration (Li) and the crash cost
(C(Li)) for each crash pattern of test duration. The distinctive fea-
ture here is that the cost (cj) of shortening the test duration is
greatest for the unit periods for processes 3 and 4 in Table 2. The
reason for this is that these two processes are equivalent to the
system test and the operation test. The recruitment of people is
required for the testing effort for these processes and it is likely
that an increase in personnel costs can be expected in order to
shorten the duration of the test. In general, there is a tradeoff rela-
tionship between the work period and the costs in manufacturing
sites and construction sites. If a decision is made to ﬁnish a project
in a shorter than normal period of time, it will be necessary to pay
wages that are higher than normal in order to secure additional
personnel in a hasty manner or it will be necessary to pay premium3.5 3.0 2.4 1.8
12 12 12 12
12.1 12.1 12.1 12.1
179,524 170,629 159,955 149,280
120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000
4,800 10,200 24,600 46,200
304,324 300,829 304,555 315,480
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lation is conducted that reﬂects these kinds of conditions and uses
the numerical examples in Fig. 8 and varies the test duration from
4.0 months to 1.8 months, the total cost TC reaches a minimum
when the test duration is 3.0 months. The calculation process is
shown in Table 4. When the test duration is long, the cost of short-
ening it may be small, but the risk of suffering a cyber-attack
increases and the overall result may not be optimal. On the other
hand, if the limit for shortening the test duration is exceeded, the
risk of suffering a cyber-attack decreases, but the costs for shorten-
ing the test duration increase and this result may be negative for
the organization. The optimum test duration of three months is
derived from the tradeoff relationship between the two factors in
the numerical example.
From the discussion above, it can be observed that the proposed
model in the present study is a model with which the optimum
values can be derived for the number of patch applications, the
application cycle, and the duration of the testing. The present study
emphasizes patch applications and pretesting as countermeasures
against cyber-attacks on production control systems, because the
risk of these attacks continues to be high. This approach is also
applicable to software measures in general and is also highly scal-
able. Therefore, the present study presents a fundamental
approach to the topic of software security risk.
9. Conclusion
In the present study, we presented the method for quantifying
the risk of cyber-attacks on production control systems due to
security patches not being applied and for expressing the risk as
a monetary amount. The total cost TC is an evaluation function,
and it includes the test cost and the crash cost. The method was
also proposed for deriving the patch application cycle, the number
of applications, and the optimum test duration. Examples were
shown for a case where Windows XP was being used. We con-
cluded that this method help to understand the patch management
and related security measure and to protect production control
systems from cyber-attacks.
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